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ABSTRACT
This paper expands on Gibbons and Katz (1991) by looking at how the difference in wage losses
across plant closing and layoff varies with race and gender.  We find that the difference between
white males and other groups are striking and complex.  The lemons effect of layoffs for white males
as in Gibbons and Katz, but not for the other three demographic groups (white females, black
females, and black males).  These three all experience a greater decline in earnings at plant closings
than at layoffs.  This result form two reinforcing effects.  First, plant closings have substantially more
negative effects on minorities than on whites.  Second, layoffs  seem to have more negative
consequences for white men than the other groups.  We also find that the relative wage losses of
blacks following layoffs increased after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which we take as suggestive
of an informational effect of layoffs as in Gibbons and Katz.  The results are suggestive that the large
losses that African Americans experience at plant closing could result from heterogeneity in taste
discrimination across firms.
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ctaber@northwestern.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The role of asymmetric information in labor market outcomes has long been of interest to
labor economists (e.g. Akerlof, 1976, Spence, 1973 and Greenwald, 1986). Empirical studies
on this topic, however, have been scarce. In a seminal paper, Gibbons and Katz (1991;
hereafter GK) construct a model of asymmetric information in the labor market. They use
their model to argue that if ﬁrms have discretion as to which workers to lay oﬀ,al a y o ﬀ
provides a signal to the outside market that a worker is of low quality. In contrast, virtually
all workers lose their jobs when their plant closes so it does not provide a negative signal.
GK test for asymmetric information by looking at changes in wages for white collar workers.1
Since a layoﬀ provides a negative signal about ability, one would expect wages to fall more
following a layoﬀ than for a plant closing. They conﬁrm this prediction in the data showing
that wage penalties are substantially higher for layoﬀs than for plant closings.
In this paper, we take advantage of the fact that we have many more years of displaced
w o r k e r sd a t at oe x p a n do nG Kb yl o o k i n ga th o wt h ed i ﬀerence in wage losses across plant
closing and layoﬀ varies with race and gender. Statistical discrimination against African
Americans or women occurs when employers use race and gender as a predictor for produc-
tivity.2 If this is the case, then one would expect the information contained in a layoﬀ to
vary across racial and gender groups. Empirically, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences between white
males and the other groups are striking and complex. We show that the relative wage loss
at layoﬀ is substantially larger for white males than for the other groups. This is consistent
with the GK model if being laid oﬀ is a relatively more negative signal for white males than
for other demographic groups — a result that seems quite likely. However, interpretation of
our results is not quite this straightforward. In fact, we ﬁnd that this result is driven by
the fact that for three of our four demographic groups (white females, black females, and
black males) workers actually experience a greater decline in earnings at plant closings than
1They use white collar workers because they argue that blue-collar jobs are much more likely to be
covered by collective bargaining agreements. In that case seniority is typically the main determinant of lay
oﬀ decisions so that a layoﬀ will not necessarily convey negative information.
2The theory of statistical discrimination was introduced by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) and subse-
quently developed by, among others, Aigner and Cain (1977), Lundberg and Startz (1983), and Coate and
Loury (1993). Empirical studies of statistical discrimination are still scarce. A notable exception is Altonji
and Pierret (2001). Altonji and Blank (1999) presents a survey on this topic.
1at layoﬀs. This means that the simple GK prediction holds for only one of the four groups.
This results from two reinforcing eﬀects. First, that plant closings have substantially more
negative eﬀects on minorities than on whites. Second, layoﬀs seem to have more negative
consequences for white men than the other groups.
Does this mean that we should discard the GK model? We think clearly not. However, the
simple model is not suﬃcient to explain all of the data. We propose three diﬀerent “theories”
for these empirical ﬁndings. First, in Section 2, we propose a model of heterogenous human
capital in which diﬀerent types of ﬁrms hire diﬀerent types of workers. We model layoﬀs
and plant closings as resulting when shocks hit ﬁrms in which they work. Severe shocks lead
the plants to cease operation (plant closings) while less severe shocks lead them to reduce
the size of their workforce (layoﬀs). In general plant closings will diﬀer from layoﬀs, but
which eﬀect leads to larger wage declines depends on the correlation structure of the shock
across ﬁrms. This model is consistent with the data when diﬀerent demographic groups
posses diﬀerent types of human capital and when shocks aﬀect diﬀerent types of workers
diﬀerently. The second possibility is that both asymmetric information and heterogenous
human capital are present. On one hand, plant closing can be more devastating than layoﬀ
because it is associated with larger negative shock to the human capital of a particular
worker. On the other hand, layoﬀ can send a bad signal to the market and thus have
additional negative consequences on the worker. If layoﬀ is a substantially more negative
signal for white males than for other groups, this could lead the information hit for layoﬀ to
dominate for white males while the human capital aspect dominates for the other groups.
A third possibility is that the stronger negative consequences of plant closing for minority
groups could be explained if some ﬁrms discriminate against minorities more than others as
in the taste discrimination model of Becker (1971). Minority workers are likely to match
with nondiscriminatory ﬁrms. As a result, plant closings are likely to have strong negative
impacts on these workers. In contrast, if some ﬁrms are discriminatory then minorities who
experience layoﬀs may be more likely to be laid oﬀ by a discriminatory ﬁrm.
Our data is not rich enough to precisely distinguish between these three diﬀerent hypothe-
ses that have very diﬀerent interpretations for how one views the labor market. However,
we provide some additional evidence that is suggestive that the second two explanations are
important. In support of the third explanation we demonstrate that the racial eﬀect at plant
closing is surprisingly robust to inclusion of region, industry, and occupation dummies. We
2argue that this would seem unlikely if heterogeneous human capital were the whole story. To
look at asymmetric information we make use of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which induced
employers to layoﬀ “protected” workers in mass layoﬀs rather than ﬁre them for cause. As a
result, layoﬀ should become a relatively more negative signal for blacks after 1991 than prior.
Thus, if asymmetric information is important, one would expect the relative wage losses of
blacks following layoﬀs to increase after 1991 which is precisely what we ﬁnd. So while we
can not formally reject the pure heterogenous human capital model, we show that our re-
sults are consistent with the view that two sources of discrimination are present, statistical
discrimination in the second “theory” and taste discrimination in the third.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical
framework for heterogenous human capital. Section 3 describes the data. Empirical results
are reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 discusses the results.
2 Conceptual Framework for Heterogenous Human Cap-
ital
As we describe in the introduction, our data are inconsistent with the basic model presented
in GK. Our goal in this section is to present an alternative model of plant closings and layoﬀs
which is consistent with the data. The key diﬀerence is that we allow for heterogenous human
capital. We use the model to show that the relative wage loss associated with plant closings
and layoﬀs depends very much on the underlying source of the shocks and could easily go in
either direction. We should point out that we do not view this heterogenous human capital
model as a substitute for a model of asymmetric information, but rather as a complement
to it. Not only is it feasible that heterogenous human capital and asymmetric information
coexist in the labor market, but it is almost obvious that both are present.
We allow for a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent sectors in a particular labor market, j =1 ,...,J.
Within each sector, many identical ﬁrms can potentially enter so the labor market is com-
petitive with free entry. Thus free entry guarantees that for each sector that participates in
the market, proﬁtf o re a c hﬁrm is zero.
A key to the model is that human capital is heterogeneous. In particular we allow L
diﬀerent types of human capital with ` =1 ,...,L. Assume that production for a ﬁrm from









where Hj`t is the amount of human capital of type ` employed by ﬁrms of type j at time t.
Since the production function is constant returns to scale it is not important to determine
relative sizes of ﬁrms within a sector. We allow αj`t to be zero for some ﬁrms and worker
types.
In equilibrium there will be a single wage for each type of human capital that clears the
market. We deﬁne that as w`t. Since the labor market is competitive, each ﬁrm type that











j`t = w`t. (1)
Since there is free entry for ﬁrms of type j, we know that proﬁt must be zero for each ﬁrm of
type j who enters the market during time period t.L e tPjt be a dummy variable indicating
whether ﬁrms of type j participate in the market at time t and deﬁne `jt to be some value

















































< 0 for Pjt =0 . (3)
Finally we assume that labor of type ` is supplied inelastically at level H`.S ot h el a b o r
market clears when for each `,
J X
j=1
PjtHj`t = H`. (4)
Thus the conditions (1),(2),(3), and (4) characterize the equilibrium. Generally we
expect the total number of sectors that participate to be no larger than the number of
human capital types (i.e.
PJ
j=1 Pjt ≤ L).3
3Generally we expect
PJ
j=1 Pjt ≤ L because with L diﬀerent wages, it is unlikely that proﬁtc o u l db e
4Our goal is to use this model to understand displacement which occurs when the produc-
tion parameters (αj`t) for a sector change over time. A layoﬀ occurs when a sector reacts to
the parameter change by laying oﬀ some, but not all, of its workers. A plant closing occurs
when a sector leaves the market completely. If the decline in productivity occurred to a
single ﬁrm, no eﬀect would result since no one ﬁrm aﬀects the market equilibrium. Thus the
interesting case occurs when the productivity shocks are correlated across ﬁrms.
We will show that the model does not have strong predictions about the relative wage
losses associated with layoﬀs versus plant closings. They will tend to diﬀer depending on
the correlation structure of the productivity shocks. One type of productivity shock occurs
when a sector wide shock hits all ﬁrms of type j (sector speciﬁc shocks). A negative shock of
this type will lead the sector to shrink in size. Since sectors will tend to specialize in certain
types of workers, workers of this type will be particularly hurt by the shock. If the shock is
large enough, the sector will shut down and plants will close. An example of such a shock is
a decrease in demand for a good produced by this sector.4 In this case, workers will tend to
be hurt more by plant closings than by layoﬀs.
As another case, consider technology shocks which are speciﬁc to human capital types
(factor speciﬁc shocks). That is, suppose that for a speciﬁc `∗, αj`∗t falls for all ﬁrms j =
1,...,J. This will tend to lead some ﬁrms to lay oﬀ workers of type j. These workers will be
particularly hurt by the production shock since their value in all sectors fall. An example
of this type of shock is a technological discovery that is substitutable with type j workers
(such as the improvement of word processing software for typists). Thus the nature of the
shock determines which workers are likely to be harmed the most.
As an example consider a plant that manufactures a speciﬁc type of car. If the demand
for that type of car falls, some of the workers in the plant will be laid oﬀ.I fd e m a n df a l l s
enough, the plant will close. In this case both types of displacement lead to a loss in earnings,
but the loss will be greater in the plant closing place because the demand for this type of
worker has fallen more severely. By contrast, consider a diﬀerent type of layoﬀ. Suppose it
is initiated not from a change in demand for the product, but rather a technological change
identically zero for more than L types of ﬁrms. That is since there are only L variables, it is only by
coincidence that equation (2) would hold for more than L sectors. If one type of ﬁrm is considerably more
productive than the others, it may easily be the case that
PJ
j=1 Pjt <L .
4Since we are measuring productivity in terms of dollar values, this will show up as a proportional decline
of αj`t for all ` employed in sector j.
5in how cars are produced. As a speciﬁc example, suppose a technology develops in which
all welding can be done by robotics. This would lead the plant to lay oﬀ all of its welders
(but presumably none of its other workers). This is a potentially much more severe shock to
welders. Their value in their current plant has fallen, but if all other automotive plants use
the same new technology their value at all other plants has fallen as well and we might see
enormous losses for them. To put it in a diﬀerent way, if most human capital is “occupation
speciﬁc” and plant closings result from “industry speciﬁc” shocks while layoﬀst e n dt or e s u l t
from “occupation speciﬁc” shocks then layoﬀs could have more severe consequences than
plant closings. We demonstrate this result with an example.
In order to gain an understanding into the manner in which these eﬀects may operate we
present a numerical example with two sectors and two factors (i.e. J =2and L =2 ) . We
then consider the change in equilibrium from an initial period (t =0 )to a new equilibrium
(t =1 ) . The results of the simulation are presented in Table 1. We consider a version of the
model with the elasticity parameter ρ =0 .5. F o rb a s ec a s et a k eα110 =0 .6 and α120 =0 .4
for the ﬁrst sector. We make the model symmetric by taking α210 =0 .4 and α220 =0 .6 for
the second. We use unity supply of each type H1 = H2 =1 . Solving for the equilibrium one
can show that the wages of each type are the same (at level w10 = w20 =0 .520) with sector
1 employing 69.2% o ft h et y p eo n ew o r k e r sa n d30.8% of the type two workers. The other
sector is symmetric with 30.8% of the type one workers and 69.2% o ft h et y p et w ow o r k e r s .
As a ﬁrst simulation we model a “layoﬀ”i nw h i c hs e c t o r2i sh i tb yap r o d u c t i v i t y
shock which lowers productivity by 5% for any given set of inputs (i.e. α211 =0 .38 and
α221 =0 .57). We see that this relatively small shock leads to a large change in employment
in which sector 2 goes from employing 50% of the labor force to only 20%. The average wage
change for the workers who switch sectors is -0.035 which combines wage gains for the type
one workers and considerable wage losses for the type two workers.
To simulate a plant closing, we impose a productivity shock large enough to lead sector
t w ot oc l o s e( e . g .α211 = α221 =0 , but much less severe shocks can lead the sector to shut
down). These results are shown in Table 1 under Simulation 2. As predicted this leads to a
more severe fall in wages for the plant closing workers than in the previous simulation.
Finally we simulate a layoﬀ resulting from factor speciﬁc shock by keeping the share
parameter for factor 1 constant (i.e. αj11 = αj10), but allowing αj21 to fall by 20%. Once
again this leads to considerable layoﬀs of both types of workers from the sector 2 ﬁrms.
6Wages of type 1 workers do not change,5 but type two workers experience large wage losses
and we see that the average wage loss is large.
In summary, we interpret simulation 2 as representing a plant closing while simulations
1a n d3r e p r e s e n tt w od i ﬀerent types of layoﬀs. In one case the wage loss is greater for
layoﬀs than for plant closing while in another case it is smaller, so the model has no strong
prediction about the relative size of layoﬀsv e r s u sp l a n tc l o s i n g s .
Again, it is important to point out that we do not view this model as at odds with
asymmetric information. One could easily allow for asymmetric information of the form of
GK and place it into this model. In that case, one would expect layoﬀ to have an additional
negative impact on wages through the lemon eﬀect. One would not see the same eﬀect for
plant closings.
3D a t a
We use data from the biennial Displaced Workers Surveys (DWSs) Supplement to the Current
Population Survey (CPS) between 1984 and 2002. The DWSs were conducted as part of the
January CPSs in 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992 and 2002 and the February CPSs in 1994, 1996,
1998 and 2000. Each of the supplements from 1984-1992 asks workers if they lost a job at any
time in the previous 5-year period, and each supplement from 1994-2002 asks this question
but for the previous 3-year period.6 Displacement is deﬁned as involuntary separation based
on operating decisions of the employer such as plant closing, employer going out of business,
layoﬀ from which the worker was not recalled. Other events including quits and being ﬁred
for cause were not considered displacement. Thus, the supplement is designed to focus on
the loss of jobs that results from business decisions of ﬁrms unrelated to the performance
of particular workers. If the response to the job loss question is positive, the respondent is
then asked about the reason of job loss: 1) plant closing, 2) slack work, 3) position or shift
abolished, 4) seasonal jobs ended, 5) self-employment failed, and 6) other. The data have
information on workers’ demographics, tenure on pre-displacement job, occupation, industry
5The fact that these wages do not change at all comes from our choice of ρ =0 .5.
6The DWSs ask and collect information on at most one job loss for each individual. If the respondent
lost more than one job in the reference period, she/he is asked about information only for the longest job
lost.
7and weekly earnings, weeks of joblessness after displacement and current weekly earnings.7
We restrict the sample to workers aged 20-64 who lost a job in the private sector in the
preceding 3-year period due to plant closing, slack work or position or shift abolished, and
are reemployed in the private sector at the survey date. We only focus on workers who
made full time to full time job transitions (i.e. lost a full-time job and are re-employed
on a full-time job).8 We exclude workers who have re-employment weekly real earnings
under $40. Earnings are deﬂated by the 1982-84=100 consumer price index (CPI). As in
GK we distinguish between blue- and white-collar workers. The white collar sample consists
of workers with pre-displacement jobs as managers and administrators, professional and
technical workers, clerical workers, and sales workers while the blue collar sample consists
of workers with pre-displacement jobs as craft and kindred workers, operatives, laborers,
transport operatives, or service workers. We exclude workers in agriculture and construction
industries.
Descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in Tables 2A and 2B. We divide the data
into sixteen diﬀerent groups, classifying by gender, race, blue/white collar, and layoﬀ/plant




The main focus of our empirical work is on the wage losses associated with plant closings and
layoﬀs for various demographic groups. To a large extent our main results can all be seen
from our summary statistics in Table 2A. Note that we have a much longer history of data
than Gibbons and Katz who only used 1984-1986. Since we can now extend the data until
2002, our sample size is large enough to condition on speciﬁc demographic groups. The key
7In 1994 and later DWSs, individuals who report a job loss for the reasons other than the ﬁrst three are
not asked follow-up questions about the lost job.
8We restrict to the sample to full time jobs (at least 35 hours per week) because the DWSs only provided
information on usual weekly earnings (and not hourly earnings) and the full/part time status of the worker’s
old job. By limiting our sample to full time workers we attempt to control for hours of work on the old job.
8variable is the change in the logarithm of the real wage which is shown in the third row. First,
focusing on white males one can see that the main prediction of the Gibbons and Katz model
holds up. White men lose approximately 6% of their wages at plant closings, but this rises to
around 10% at layoﬀs. This can be interpreted as evidence that asymmetric information is
important.9 However, for the other three demographic groups the point estimates actually go
in the wrong direction. In particular, for A f r i c a nA m e r i c a nm a l e sa n df e m a l e st h ed i ﬀerence
is huge with substantially larger wage losses associated with plant closings than with layoﬀs.
Both of these eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant.10 In Table 2B we present results for blue
collar workers, and like Gibbons and Katz, we ﬁnd that wage losses are similar for plant
closing as for layoﬀ. This result holds approximately for all four demographic groups.
A key question is why the relative losses at plant closing and layoﬀ vary so much across
the demographic groups in Table 2A. Is it because the losses at plant closing are larger, or
is it that the losses at layoﬀs are smaller? To add control variables and formally test for
diﬀerences, we set up the model in a regression framework. The main results for white collar
workers are presented in Table 3A. The key dependent variable is the change in log wages.
We regress that variable on black and female dummy variables interacted with layoﬀ and
plant closing. Note that this speciﬁcation is not completely free in that we do not interact
race with gender so that the gender eﬀect is constrained to be the same for the two diﬀerent
races.11 One can see that the results described above depend on diﬀerences at both layoﬀ and
plant closing. In particular, blacks experience both smaller wage losses at layoﬀ and larger
losses at plant closing. However, the plant closing eﬀect seems to be the larger of the two and
the layoﬀ eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. A particularly striking
aspect of the results is the robustness of the plant closing/black interaction to inclusion of
control variables. In particular it is surprising to us that occupation, industry, and region
controls seem to make little diﬀerence in the ﬁnal result. To show that this is not just a result
9Krashinsky (2002) provides an alternative explanation and attributes the diﬀerences in wage losses be-
tween workers displaced by plant closings and layoﬀst od i ﬀerences in ﬁrm size of pre-displacement employers.
He argues that small ﬁrms are more likely to close down when facing adverse economic shocks, while larger
ﬁrms are more likely to reduce their workforce. Therefore laid-oﬀ workers tend to lose any wage premium
or rents they earned from working at large ﬁrms.
10The t-stat for men is 1.93 so falls barely below the 5% convention, but is well above the 10% level. For
women, the t-stat is well above 1.96.
11We do this to increase the precision of the results.
9of noisy controls, in Table 4A we run the same regressions using the log of wage levels prior
to displacement as the dependent variable. The parameters change substantially as we add
more control variables (i.e. looking across columns). In particular the plant closing/black
interaction that we focused on in Table 3A falls by over 40%. This strongly suggests that the
extra wage loss accompanying plant closing for African American workers is not simply due
to diﬀerences in the sector of the economy in which they were employed. One explanation
for this result is that there is heterogeneity in employer taste discrimination across ﬁrms.
When a nondiscriminatory plant exits the market, black workers are particularly hurt.
For women the story portrayed in Table 3A is quite diﬀerent. We see virtually no diﬀer-
ence at plant closing between men and women, but women experience much smaller wage
declines following a layoﬀ. This can be explained by a model in which in the absence of
information, losses at plant closing are larger than for layoﬀ. However, asymmetric infor-
mation counteracts this eﬀect. It seems quite feasible that the human capital eﬀect could
dominate for white women while the lemons eﬀect dominates for men.
In Table 3B we present results for blue collar workers. The interactions are virtually all
smaller in absolute value than those in Table 3A, and none of the interactions are statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
4.2 Extensions
4.2.1 Employment Discrimination Legislation
The GK model assumes that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts and rationally decide whom to dismiss.
It also assumes that the only way for an employer to dismiss low quality workers is through
al a y o ﬀ. In reality, ﬁrms can also let go workers by ﬁring them for cause. It is plausible that
ﬁrms can ﬁre the lowest quality workers in the initial period, and when facing a shock, lay
oﬀ the next lowest quality workers in a later period. Non-economic factors, such as concerns
about discrimination lawsuits, can lead employers to alter their methods of dismissal. For
example, if workers are more likely to sue for wrongful termination when ﬁred than when
dismissed as a part of layoﬀ (see for example, Donohue and Siegelman (1993)), then increases
in the expected costs to ﬁrms should induce substitution toward layoﬀs and away from
individual ﬁrings (i.e. lowering cutoﬀ in the initial screen for those who are more likely to
sue).
10A recent paper by Oyer and Schaefer (2000) tests the hypothesis by exploring the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA91), which increases the expected costs to ﬁrms of
displacing “protected” employees (such as blacks and females).12 Using data from the 1987-
1993 SIPP, they ﬁnd that, relative to whites, rates of overall involuntary job loss (including
both layoﬀ and ﬁring) of black men were unaﬀected by CRA91.13 However, while black
men were signiﬁcantly more likely to be ﬁr e dt h a nw h i t em e ni nt h ep r e - C R A 9 1p e r i o d ,
this diﬀerence disappeared in the post-CRA91 period. Since we are examining layoﬀsr a t h e r
than ﬁrings, their results imply that a layoﬀ would become a more negative signal of the
productivity of black workers after the CRA91. As a result, we would expect wages to fall
more dramatically at layoﬀs for blacks relative to whites after 1991 than before.14
The DWSs data contain information about the year in which workers lost their jobs, by
which we divide the sample into two sub-periods: 1981-1991 and 1992-2001. In Table 5 we
repeat the speciﬁcation of Table 3A except we interact all of the main coeﬃcients with a
dummy variable for post 1991. The point estimates tell a strong story. That conforms with
our prediction if signalling is important. Relative to whites, the wage hit associated with a
layoﬀ is substantially larger after 1991. To put it more literally, prior to 1991 whites had
much larger wage declines at layoﬀ than blacks, but that diﬀerence essentially disappeared
after the CRA91. Further evidence that this is not just sporadic comes from examining
the other coeﬃcients. None substantially diﬀer before and after the civil rights act. It is
important to keep in mind that the conﬁdence interval for the key interaction found in the
12While previous federal employment discrimination legislation typically limited plaintiﬀ recovery to lost
wages, CRA91 allows employees to sue for intentional gender and race discrimination up to $300,000 in
punitive damages; furthermore, CRA91 allows employees to claim unlawful termination on the basis of race
to sue for unlimited punitive damages. (See Oyer and Schaefer for more details of the law.)
13The data used in Oyer and Shaefer (2000) can not separately identify job losses due to plant closing
from the other forms of layoﬀs (selective downsizings such as abolished positions).
14There might be other reasons for worrying about changes over time in general. It is widely believed
that there has been an increase in the number of layoﬀs (selective downsizings, in which some workers are
discontinued and others stay at the ﬁrm), especially from white collar jobs in some large corporations, in the
early to mid-1990s. Findings in Farber (1997 and 2003) lead support to this belief. He ﬁnds that although
the overall involuntary job loss rate did not change substantially from the 1980s to 1990s, there was a decade-
long increase in the rate of job loss due to position abolished. If mass layoﬀs occur increasingly frequently,
then the event layoﬀ might become less informative about individual worker’s productivity. Therefore we
would expect the diﬀerence in wage losses between layoﬀs and plant closings to become smaller over time.
11ﬁrst row of Table 5 is wide. It is signiﬁcant at the 10% level (or 5% one-sided level) with
a large point estimate. At the very least, we ﬁnd these results highly suggestive that layoﬀ
appears to be a relatively more negative signal of quality for African American workers after
the CRA91.
4.2.2 Length of Unemployment
Our results to this point have focused only on wages. However, an obvious selection prob-
lem arises since we focus only on workers who have been subsequently hired. We are also
interested in the overall well being of these individuals which depends not only on the wage
impact of displacement, but also the length of the subsequent unemployment spell.
To examine this, we follow GK and use a Weibull proportional hazard model to analyze





where Xi is observable covariates, t is duration and (γ,β) are parameters. The nice aspect
of the Weibull model is that the expected value of the log duration is linear so that if Ti







In Table 6 we report estimates of our model using a speciﬁcation analogous to Table 3.
We report the coeﬃcients in terms of change in average log duration (−β/γ). For clarity, a
positive number means that the average unemployment spell would be longer.
The basic results in Table 6 are quite similar to those found in Table 3. First one can
see that for white collar workers, layoﬀ is associated with signiﬁcantly longer unemployment
spells, while the results for blue collar workers are mirkier. (In their smaller sample Gibbons
15The DWS data contain information about total weeks of joblessness since displacement, and starting
1986, they also provide information on the number of jobs held by a worker since displacement. These
two variables allow us to determine the length of the initial spell of joblessness for those employed in their
ﬁrst job at the survey date and the censored length of the initial spell for those who had not worked since
displacement. We then construct a sample of ﬁrst spells of joblessness subject to the following additional
restrictions: workers aged 20-64 who were displaced in previous three years from full-time, private sector
jobs not in agriculture and construction industries and had weekly wage no less than $40.
12and Katz did not ﬁnd this.) We also again see that plant closing has a much more negative
impact on African Americans than on white workers.
Other results are somewhat diﬀerent in that we ﬁnd that layoﬀs are associated with
longer unemployment spells for women and blacks than for white males. We do not ﬁnd
this result surprising since the employment eﬀect we are looking at here is about the level
while the wage eﬀect in Table 3 is about the change. They do not necessarily contradict each
other. Another result that tells a somewhat diﬀerent story than before is that in Table 3A
we found that white males are the only group for which layoﬀ is worse than plant closing. In
terms of unemployment spells white women seem to look similar to white men in the sense
that unemployment spells are longer following a layoﬀ. For blacks, there is little diﬀerence
between plant closing and layoﬀ while the wage hit associated with plant closings was much
larger than that associated with layoﬀ.
Overall, we view these results as telling a story similar to those in Table 3. Relative to
layoﬀs, plant closings are associated with much longer spells of unemployments for blacks
than for whites.
5 Discussion
To summarize our basic results, we ﬁnd that plant closings have substantially more negative
eﬀects on minorities than on whites. In contrast we ﬁnd that layoﬀs seem to have more neg-
ative consequences for white men than the other groups. For three of our four demographic
groups (black men, black women, and white women) we ﬁnd the opposite of the Gibbons
and Katz prediction; plant closings lead to more negative consequences than do layoﬀs. In
this discussion we propose three diﬀerent “theories” for why this might be true.
1. The ﬁrst comes directly from our model in Section 2. One possibility is just that
diﬀerent demographic groups possess diﬀerent quantities of human capital types and
that shocks aﬀect diﬀerent workers diﬀerently.
2. The second possibility is to incorporate the Gibbons and Katz asymmetric information
into our model of heterogenous human capital. It is quite possible that in the absence
of information issues, plant closing is more devastating than lay oﬀ because it is as-
sociated with a stronger negative shock for the human capital of a particular worker.
13At the same time, as a counteracting eﬀect, layoﬀ may reveal lemons so one would
expect an additional negative impact for them. Which eﬀect is larger would depend
on the relative size of the signal. It seems quite plausible to us that a layoﬀ may be
a substantially more negative signal for white males than for the other groups. This
could lead the information eﬀect to dominate for white males while the human capital
aspect dominates for the other groups which could explain our results.
3. An intriguing aspect of our empirical results is that the negative consequences of plant
closing are much worse for African Americans. One explanation for this result is
that some ﬁrms discriminate against minorities more than others as in Becker (1971).
Minority workers would be likely to match with nondiscriminatory ﬁrms. The closing of
these nondiscriminatory plants is likely to have strong negative consequences for these
workers. In contrast, if some ﬁrms are discriminatory then minorities who experience
layoﬀs may be more likely to be laid oﬀ by a discriminatory ﬁrm. If this is the case,
o n ew o u l dn o te x p e c tt os e es u c ha ne ﬀect in layoﬀs. Incorporating this possibility
into our model would be straightforward by allowing diﬀerent sectors to have diﬀerent
levels of taste discrimination against minority workers.
Our data are not rich enough to precisely distinguish between these three diﬀerent (but
not mutually exclusive) hypotheses that have very diﬀerent interpretations for how one views
the labor market. However, we think our results are suggestive that explanation 2 and 3 are
important. In support of explanation 3, we ﬁnd it striking how little the results are aﬀected
by including industry and occupation dummies (Table 3A). If the model in section 2 were
correct, one would expect these controls to be very important — and they are when one looks
at wage levels (Table 4A).
We think the strongest evidence in favor of asymmetric information can be found in Table
5. Oyer and Schaefer (2000) provide evidence suggesting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
induced employers to lay oﬀ “protected” workers in mass layoﬀs rather than ﬁre them for
cause. As a result, layoﬀ should become a relatively more negative signal for blacks after
1991 than prior. Thus, if asymmetric information is important, one would expect the relative
wage losses of blacks following layoﬀs to increase after 1991 which is precisely what we ﬁnd.
Ultimately, we ﬁnd these results interesting and intriguing, but not deﬁnitive. We hope
that alternative data sources can be found which will shed more light on these important
14issues.
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17Table 1: Simulation Results
Base Simulation Simulation Simulation
Case 1 2 3
Parameters:
ρ 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
α11 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600
α12 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.320
α21 0.400 0.380 0.000 0.400
α22 0.600 0.570 0.000 0.480
Results:
w1 0.520 0.569 0.600 0.520
w2 0.520 0.435 0.400 0.333
H11 0.692 0.922 1.000 0.892
H12 0.308 0.700 1.000 0.619
∆wage -0.035 -0.059 -0.114
Note: This table presents results from simulation of the model
outlined in Section 2 of the paper. We ﬁrst present the ba-
sic parameters for the simulations and then show the equilib-
rium wages and labor force allocation. The last row, ∆ wage,
presents the average change in wages for the displaced workers





    Male White  Male Black 
 
Female White  Female Black 











































































































































































































No.  obs    1,670 2,170  92  91  1,741 1,841  162  165 
 
Sample selections: (1) White collar workers aged 20-64; (2) lost job for 3 reasons: plant closing, 
position abolished or slack work;  (3) lost a job in previous 3 years; (4) re-employed at survey 
date; (5) full time to full time transition; (6) private sector to private sector; (7) delete if re-
employment weekly wage<$40; (8) delete agriculture and construction. 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  




    Male White  Male Black 
 
Female White  Female Black 












































































































































































































No.  obs    2,108  2,515  206 201 763 682 142 110 
 
Sample selections: (1) Blue collar workers aged 20-64; (2) lost job for 3 reasons: plant closing, 
position abolished or slack work;  (3) lost a job in previous 3 years; (4) re-employed at survey 
date; (5) full time to full time transition; (6) private sector to private sector; (7) delete if re-
employment weekly wage<$40; (8) delete agriculture and construction. 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Table 3A: DWS 1984-2002 
(White Collar) 
 
Dep Var: Change in Log wage  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












































Constant   -0.062 
(0.011)
Y Y  Y 
Married, Age, Age2, Education 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Yr dummies, Yrs since disp, Region 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Pre-displacement tenure (1-3, 3-5,5-10,10+, 
omitted <1)) 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Industry  
 
 --  --  Y  Y 
Occupation     --  --  --  Y 
          
N       6,981  6,981  6,978 6,978 
 
Sample selections: See Table 2A.  Table 3B: DWS 1984-2002 
(Blue Collar) 
 
Dep Var: Change in Log wage  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 













































Constant   -0.087 
(0.010)
Y Y  Y 
Married, Age, Age2, Education 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Yr dummies, Yrs since disp, Region 
  
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Pre-displacement tenure (1-3, 3-5,5-10,10+, 
omitted <1)) 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Industry 
  
 --  --  Y  Y 
Occupation     --  --  --  Y 
          
N   5,926  5,926  5,885  5,875 
  
Sample selections: See Table 2B. Table 4A: DWS 1984-2002 
(White Collar) 
 
Dep Var: Log Pre-displacement Wage  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












































Constant   6.050 
(0.014)
Y Y  Y 
Married, Age, Age2, Education 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Yr dummies, Yrs since disp, Region 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Pre-displacement tenure (1-3, 3-5,5-10,10+, 
omitted <1)) 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Industry  
 
 --  --  Y  Y 
Occupation     --  --  --  Y 
          
N       6,982  6,982  6,979 6,979 
 
Sample selections: See Table 2A. 
  
Table 4B: DWS 1984-2002 
(Blue Collar) 
 
Dep Var: Log Pre-displacement Wage  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












































Constant   5.724 
(0.011)
Y Y  Y 
Married, Age, Age2, Education 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Yr dummies, Yrs since disp, Region 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Pre-displacement tenure (1-3, 3-5,5-10,10+, 
omitted <1)) 
 
 --  Y  Y  Y 
Industry  
 
 --  --  Y  Y 
Occupation     --  --  --  Y 
          
N       5,926  5,926  5,885 5,875 
 
Sample selections: See Table 2B. 
 Table 5: DWS 1984-2002 
(White Collar Only) 
 
Dep Var: Change in Log wage  
 (1)  (2) 


























































Married, Age, Age2, Education 
 
-- Y 
Pre-displacement tenure (1-3, 3-5,5-
10,10+, omitted <1))  
 
-- Y 
Yrs since disp., Yr dummies, Regions 
 
-- Y 
Industry, Occupation  --  Y 
    
N 6,981  6,978 
 
  Sample selections: See Table 2A. 
 Table 6: DWS 1986-2002 
Effects on Duration of the First Spell of Joblessness since Displacement 
Dependent Variable: Log (Weeks of Joblessness) 
MLE Estimates from Weibull Duration Model  
  White  Collar  Blue  Collar 


































































Married, Age, Age2 
 
-- Y  Y    -- Y Y 
Education 
 
-- Y  Y    -- Y Y 
Pre-displacement tenure (1-
3, 3-5,5-10,10+, omitted 
<1)) 
 
-- Y  Y    -- Y Y 
Yr dummies, Yrs since 
disp, Regions 
 
-- Y  Y    -- Y Y 
Industry, Occupation 
 
-- Y  Y    -- Y Y 
Log Pre-displacement wage  --  --  -0.054 
(0.037) 
 --  --  0.003 
(0.049) 
            















N  5,244 5,227  4,613   4,433 4,348 3,952 
 
Sample selections: (1) workers aged 20-64; (2) lost job for 3 reasons: plant closing, position 
abolished or slack work; (3) lost a job in previous 3 years; (4) had 0 or 1 job after displacement 
(5) displaced from full time jobs; (6) displaced from private sector jobs; (7) delete if pre-
displacement weekly wage<$40; (8) not displaced from agriculture and construction. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 